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Abstract—An autonomous and resilient controller is proposed
for leader-follower multi-agent systems under uncertainties and
cyber-physical attacks. The leader is assumed non-autonomous
with a nonzero control input, which allows changing the team
behavior or mission in response to environmental changes. A
resilient learning-based control protocol is presented to find
optimal solutions to the synchronization problem in the presence
of attacks and system dynamic uncertainties. An observer-based
distributed H∞ controller is first designed to prevent propagating
the effects of attacks on sensors and actuators throughout the
network, as well as to attenuate the effect of these attacks on
the compromised agent itself. Non-homogeneous game algebraic
Riccati equations are derived to solve the H∞ optimal synchro-
nization problem and off-policy reinforcement learning is utilized
to learn their solution without requiring any knowledge of the
agent’s dynamics. A trust-confidence based distributed control
protocol is then proposed to mitigate attacks that hijack the entire
node and attacks on communication links. A confidence value is
defined for each agent based solely on its local evidence. The
proposed resilient reinforcement learning algorithm employs the
confidence value of each agent to indicate the trustworthiness
of its own information and broadcast it to its neighbors to
put weights on the data they receive from it during and after
learning. If the confidence value of an agent is low, it employs a
trust mechanism to identify compromised agents and remove the
data it receives from them from the learning process. Simulation
results are provided to show the effectiveness of the proposed
approach.
Index Terms—Autonomous Controller, Resilient Controller,
Reinforcement Learning, Multi-agent System, Distributed Con-
trol, H∞ control.
I. Introduction
The term autonomous is a combination of the Greek words
auto (self) and nomous (law, rule) [1]. In system theory,
an autonomous system is a system that is self-governing
and does not explicitly depend on the independent variable.
If the independent variable is time, these systems are also
called time-invariant systems. On the other hand, in control
theory, an autonomous control is a self-governing control
system in the sense that it acts independently and does not
rely on prior knowledge of the system dynamics and human
intervention. An autonomous controller should be able to learn
from what it perceives to compensate for partial or incorrect
prior knowledge.
Autonomous control design for a multi-agent system (MAS)
has gained significant interest due to applications in a variety
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of disciplines from robot swarms to power systems and wire-
less sensor networks. In a distributed MAS, decisions are made
locally using only agents’ available information. This provides
scalability, flexibility and avoids a single point of failure [2]–
[5]. However, designing autonomous controllers for MASs is
challenging and requires learning from experience. Moreover,
distributed MASs are prone to cyber-physical attacks. Due to
their networked nature, attacks can escalate into disastrous
consequences and significantly degrade the performance of the
entire network [6]. In a contested environment with adversarial
inputs, corrupted data communicated by a single compromised
agent can be propagated to the entire network through its
neighbors. This corrupted data will be used by autonomous
agents for learning which misleads the entire network and,
consequently, causes no emergent behavior or an emergent
misbehavior. The main bottleneck in deploying successful
distributed MASs is designing secure control protocols that
can learn about system uncertainties while showing some level
of functionality in the presence of cyber-physical attacks.
Reinforcement learning (RL) [7]–[9], inspired by learning
mechanisms observed in mammals, has been successfully used
to learn optimal solutions online in single agent systems for
both regulation and tracking control problems [10]–[16] and
recently for MASs [17]–[19]. Existing RL-based controllers
for leader-follower MASs assume that the leader is passive
and without any control input. In this case, the leader is
not able to react to environmental or mission changes by
replanning its trajectories. On the other hand, existing active
leader controllers (e.g., [20]–[22]) are not autonomous as they
require having complete knowledge of the leader and agent’s
dynamics. Moreover, these approaches are generally far from
optimal and only take into account the stability, which is the
bare minimum requirement. Finally, existing learning-based
RL solutions to MASs are not resilient against cyber-physical
attacks.
Resilient control protocols for MASs have been designed
in the literature [23]–[35] to mitigate attacks. Most of the
existing approaches either use the discrepancy among the
state of agents and their neighbors to detect and mitigate
attacks, or use an exact model of agents to predict expected
normal behavior and, thus, detect an abnormality caused by
attacks. However, we will show that a stealthy attack on one
agent can cause an emergent misbehavior in the network
with no discrepancy between agent’s states and, therefore,
the former approaches cannot mitigate these type of attacks.
Moreover, this discrepancy could be a result of a legitimate
change in the state of the leader. Blindly rejecting the agent’s
neighbor information can harm the network connectivity and
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2the convergence of the network. On the other hand, model-
based approaches require a complete knowledge of the agent’s
dynamics, which may not be available in many practical
applications and avoid the design of autonomous controllers.
H∞ control protocols have also been proposed to attenuate the
effect of disturbances in MASs [36]–[38]. However, as shown
in this paper, standard H∞ control protocols can be misled and
become entirely ineffective by a stealthy attack. To the author’s
knowledge, designing an autonomous and resilient controller
that does not require any knowledge of the agent’s dynamic
and can survive against cyber-physical attacks has not been
investigated yet.
This paper presents an autonomous and resilient dis-
tributed control protocol for leader-follower MASs with a non-
autonomous leader. To alleviate the effects of attacks on the
MASs, a distributed observer-based control protocol is first
developed to prevent corrupted sensory data caused by attacks
on sensors and actuators from propagating across the network.
To this end, only the leader communicates its actual sensory
information and other agents estimate the leaders’ state using a
distributed observer. To further improve resiliency, distributed
H∞ control protocols are designed to attenuate the effect of the
attacks on the compromised agent itself. Non-homogeneous
game algebraic Riccati equations (ARE) are derived for solv-
ing the optimal H∞ synchronization problem for each agent.
An off-policy RL algorithm is developed to learn the solutions
of the non-homogeneous game ARE without requiring the
complete knowledge of the agent’s dynamics. To avoid the
usage of corrupted data coming from compromised neighbors
during and after learning, a trust-confidence based control
protocol is developed for attacks on communication links and
attacks that hijack the entire node. A confidence value is
defined for each agent based solely on its local evidence.
Then, each agent communicates its confidence value with
neighbors to indicate the trustworthiness of its own informa-
tion. Moreover, a trust value is defined for each neighbor to
determine the significance of the incoming information. The
agent incorporates these trust values along with the confidence
values received from neighbors in its update law to eventually
isolate the compromised agent.
II. Preliminary
In this section, a background of the graph theory is pro-
vided. A directed graph G consists of a pair (V,E) in which
V = {v1, · · · , vN} is a set of nodes and E ⊆ V × V is a set
of edges. The adjacency matrix is defined as A =
[
ai j
]
, with
ai j > 0 if (v j, vi) ∈ E, and ai j = 0 otherwise. The set of nodes vi
with edges incoming to node v j is called the neighbors of node
vi, namely Ni = {v j : (v j, vi) ∈ E}. The graph Laplacian matrix
is defined as L = D −A, where D = diag(di) is the in-degree
matrix, with di =
∑
j∈Ni ai j as the weighted in-degree of node
vi. A (directed) tree is a connected digraph that in-degree of
every node is one, except the root node. A directed graph has
a spanning tree if there exists a directed tree that connects all
nodes of the graph. A leader can be pinned to multiple nodes,
resulting in a diagonal pinning matrix G = diag (bi) ∈ RN×N
with the pinning gain bi > 0 when the node has access to the
leader node and bi = 0, otherwise. 1N is the N-vector of ones
and Im(R) denotes the range space of R. λmin(A) denotes the
minimum eigenvalue of matrix A. ‖.‖ denotes the Euclidean
norm for vectors or the induced 2-norm for matrices. The
notation A ⊗ B is Kronecker product of matrices A and B.
Assumption 1. The communication graph has a spanning tree,
and the leader is pinned to at least one root node.
III. Standard Synchronization Control Protocols and Their
Vulnerability to attacks
In this section, the standard synchronization control protocol
for MASs is reviewed and its vulnerability to attacks is
examined. Consider N agents with identical dynamics given
by
x˙i = Axi + Bui + Dωi (1)
where xi(t) ∈ Rn and ui(t) ∈ Rm are the state and control input
of agent i, respectively. ωi(t) ∈ Rd denotes the attack signal
injected into agent i. A, B, and D are the drift, input, and
attack dynamics, respectively.
Assumption 2. The pair (A, B) is stabilizable.
Let the leader dynamics be non-autonomous, i.e., the control
input of the leader is a nonzero signal, and is given by
ζ˙0 = Aζ0 + Bv0 (2)
where ζ0(t) ∈ Rn and v0(t) ∈ Rm denote the state and input of
the leader, respectively. A and B are the same as other agents.
Assumption 3. The control input v0 is given and bounded,
i.e., there exists a positive constant vm such that ‖v0‖ ≤ vm.
Define the tracking error for agent i as
εi = xi − ζ0 (3)
Define the local neighborhood tracking error ei ∈ Rn for
agent i as [39]
ei =
∑
j∈Ni
ai j(x j − xi) + bi(ζ0 − xi) (4)
where bi > 0 is the pinning gain, and bi > 0 for at least one
root node i. The standard distributed tracking control protocol
is then given by [40]
ui = c1Kei + c2h(Kei) (5)
where c1 and c2 are positive scalar coupling gains, and K is
a design matrix gain. h(.) is a nonlinear function defined for
x ∈ Rn such that
h(x) =
 x‖x‖ , i f ‖x‖ , 00, i f ‖x‖ = 0 (6)
It can be seen that the following condition is required to
assure synchronization
εi → 0⇔ xi → ζ0 (7)
Theorem 1. [40] Consider the agent dynamics (1)-(2) with
ωi(t) = 0. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. Then, agents
synchronize to the leader, i.e., εi → 0 ∀i ∈ N under the
3controller (5) with c1 ≥ (1/λmin(L + G)), c2 ≥ vm and
K = −BT P−1, where λmin is the minimum eigenvalue of (L+G)
and P > 0 is a solution to the linear matrix inequality
AP + PAT − 2BBT < 0.
Definition 1. In a graph, agent i is reachable from agent j if
there exists a directed path of any length from node j to node
i.
Definition 2: An agent is called a disrupted/compromised
agent, if it is directly under attack. Otherwise, it is called an
intact agent.
It is shown in [40] for the proof of Theorem 1 that in the
absence of attack, if the controller is designed to make the
local neighborhood tracking error for all agents go to zero,
the synchronization is guaranteed. In the following theorem,
however, it is shown that even though the local neighborhood
tracking (4) goes to zero for all agents, in the presence of a
specific designed attack, it does not guarantee synchronization
for intact agents that have a path to a compromised agent.
Note that the leader is assumed to be a trusted agent with
more advanced sensors and with higher security. Note also
that the leader does not receive any information from other
agents, which makes it secure against attacks on other agents
and the communication network.
Lemma 1 [41]. Let Σ be a diagonal matrix with at least one
nonzero positive element, and L be the Laplacian matrix. Then,
(L + Σ) is a nonsingular M-matrix.
Theorem 2. Consider the MAS (1)-(2) with the control pro-
tocol (5). Assume that agent i is under an attack ωi that is
generated by ω˙i = Γωi , where the eigenvalues of Γ are a
subset of the eigenvalues of the agent’s dynamic A. Then, intact
agents that are reachable from agent i do not synchronize to
the leader, while their local neighborhood tracking error (4)
is zero.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Remark 1. H∞ is one of the most common and effective
approaches to attenuate disturbances. However, Theorem 2
implies that the standard H∞ controllers for MASs that use
the exchange of relative information can be bypassed by
the attacker. This is because although the goal of the H∞
is to attenuate the effect of adversarial input on the local
neighborhood tracking error, Theorem 2 shows that the at-
tacker can make the local neighborhood tracking error go to
zero, while agents are far from synchronization. Therefore, a
different controller framework and H∞ controller is presented
in this paper that guarantees attenuating attacks on sensors and
actuators of a compromised agent.
IV. The Proposed Attack Mitigation Approach
In this section, the proposed resilient control approach
is presented. First, a distributed observer-based H∞ control
protocol is developed to not only prevent attacks on physical
components, i.e., attacks on sensors and actuators (we call
them Type 1 attacks), from propagating throughout the net-
work but also attenuate their effect on the compromised agent.
Then, a trust-confidence based control protocol is examined
to identify and isolate neighbors that are compromised by
attacks on the communication network or attacks that take
over the control of a compromised agent (we call them Type
2 attacks). Figure 1 shows the structure of the proposed control
framework.
Fig. 1: The proposed autonomous and secure distributed H∞ controller for multi-agent
systems. The observer and H∞ controller allow mitigation of Type 1 attacks and designing
autonomous controllers for agents. The trust-confidence mechanism mitigates Type 2
attacks.
A. Overall structure of the proposed approach
We now formulate a resilient observer-based H∞ distributed
control protocol for MAS (1)-(2) in the presence of attacks.
In the proposed approach, only the leader communicates its
actual sensory information and followers do not exchange
their actual state information. This stops propagating Type
1 attacks from a compromised agent to others. To this end,
the followers estimate the leader’s state using a distributed
observer and communicate this estimation to their neighbors
to achieve consensus on the leader state.
The distributed observer is designed as r˙i = Ari + Bυiυi = cFηi + ρh(Fηi) ∀i = 1, . . . ,N (8)
where h(.) is defined in (6) and ηi is a revisited local neigh-
borhood observer tracking error for agent i defined by
ηi =
∑
j∈Ni
C j(t)Ti j(t)ai j(r j − ri) + bi(ζ0 − ri) (9)
where 0 ≤ C j(t) ≤ 1 is the confidence of agent j and
0 ≤ Ti j(t) ≤ 1 is the trust value of agent i to its neighbor
j. The confidence and trust values along with the design
parameters c, ρ and F in (8) are designed in subsection B to
mitigate Type 2 attacks, i.e., to identify and remove entirely
compromised agents or attacks on communication network,
and thus guarantee that ri → ζ0 for all intact agents, regardless
of attacks. To further increase resiliency at the local level and
attenuate the effects of Type 1 attacks on the compromised
agent itself, the control input ui in (1) is designed as a function
of ri and xi in subsection C (see Theorem 4) to guarantee that
the following bounded L2-gain condition is satisfied for the
agent i ∫ ∞
0 e
−αit‖zi(t)‖2dt∫ ∞
0 e
−αit‖ωi(t)‖2dt
≤ γ2i (10)
4with zi defined as the controlled or performance output and is
obtained by
‖zi‖2 = (xi − ζ0)T Qi(xi − ζ0) + uTi Riui (11)
where αi and γi represent the discount factor and the attenua-
tion level of the attack ωi, respectively, and the weight matrices
Qi and Ri are symmetric positive definite. If condition (10) is
satisfied, then, the H∞ norm of Tωi,zi , i.e., the transfer function
from the attack ωi to the performance output zi, is less than or
equal to γi. Note also that ωi(t) does not need to be a bounded
energy signal because of the discount factor αi. The problem
formulation can now be given as follows.
Problem 1. (Resilient H∞ Synchronization Problem) Con-
sider N agents defined in (1)-(2) with the distributed observer
given by (8)-(9). Design the control protocol ui = fi(xi, ri, vi)
in (1) along with C j(t), Ti j(t), c, ρ and F in (8)-(9) such that
1) The bounded L2-gain condition (10) is satisfied when
ωi , 0.
2) The synchronization problem is solved, i.e.,
‖xi(t) − ζ0(t)‖ → 0, i = 1, . . . ,N when ωi = 0.
B. The proposed distributed observer design
The distributed observer (8)-(9) only communicates the
observer state ri, which cannot be affected by Type 1 attacks
on physical components. A trust-confidence mechanism is
designed in the following to mitigate Type 2 attacks. To this
end, a confidence value is defined for each agent to indicate
the trustworthiness of its own observer information. Agents
communicate their confidence value with their neighbors to
alert them to put less weight on the information they are
receiving from them, depending on how low their level of
confidence is. This slows down the propagation of Type 2
attacks. If an agent is not confident about its own observer
information, it then assigns a trust value to its neighbors
and incorporates these trust values along with the confidence
values received from neighbors in its update law to determine
the significance of the incoming information. Figure 2 shows
the block diagram of the proposed distributed monitor.
Note also that it is assumed that the attacker designs its
signal based on Theorem 2 to deceive intact agents, so that
they cannot monitor any anomaly by examining their local
neighborhood tracking error. This is considered the worst
attack scenario. If, however, the attacker does not satisfy the
conditions of Theorem 2, then, intact agents can easily detect
attacks by using KullbackLeibler divergence criteria to check
discrepancy between the normal statistical properties of the
local neighborhood tracking error and its actual ones [42].
1) Confidence value: A confidence value is defined for each
agent which shows the validity of its information. To proceed,
define
oi = ‖ηi‖ (12)
for agent i where ηi is defined in (9). Based on Theorem 2,
ηi and, consequently, oi converges to zero for intact agents.
Now, define
si =
∑
j∈Ni
ai j
∥∥∥r j − ri∥∥∥ + bi ‖ζ0 − ri‖ (13)
Fig. 2: The distributed monitor structure.
for agent i . In contrast to oi, si does not converge to zero if
agent i is in the path of an attacker. This is because si = 0
requires r j = ri = ζ0, ∀ j ∈ Ni, which indicates that agent i and
its neighbors are synchronized and, therefore, are not in the
path of an attacker. In the absence of attack, oi and si converge
to zero and have the same behavior. Therefore, by comparing
oi and si one can detect whether or not the agent is in the path
of a compromised agent. The confidence value Ci(t) in (9) for
an intact agent i is defined as
Ci(t) = β
∫ t
0
e−β(t−τ)qi(τ)dτ (14)
with
qi(t) =
∆i
∆i + ‖si(t) − oi(t)‖ (15)
where β > 0 is a discount factor used to determine how
much we value the current experience with regard to the past
experiences. ∆i is a threshold value to account for factors
other than attacks, i.e., channel fading and disturbance. If
agent i is not in the path of any compromised agent, ‖si − oi‖
is zero almost all the time and, consequently, Ci is almost
one. On the other hand, if agent i is affected by an attacker,
then ‖si − oi‖  ∆i, and Ci is less than one and its value
depends on how close the agent is to the source of the attack.
Equation (14) can be implemented by the differential equation
C˙i(t) + βCi(t) = βqi(t). The worst case scenario is assumed in
which a disrupted agent broadcasts the confidence value 1 to
its neighbors to fool them.
2) Trust value: The trust value is defined to determine
the importance of the incoming information of each agent’s
neighbor. To calculate the trust value of agent i to agent j ,
we first measure the difference between the state of agent j
and the average of the state of all neighbors of agent i using
di j(t) = κ
∫ t
0
e−κ(t−τ)li j(t)dτ (16)
with
li j(t) =
θi∥∥∥r j(t) − hi(t)∥∥∥ + θi , hi = 1|Ni|
∑
j∈Ni
r j (17)
where hi denotes the average value of the neighbors of agent
i and |Ni| is the number of neighbors of agent i . The discount
factor κ > 0 determines how much we value the current expe-
rience of interaction with regard to the past experiences. θi is a
threshold value to take into account factors other than attacks.
5Equation (16) can be implemented as d˙i j(t) + κdi j(t) = κli j(t).
Now, we define the trust value of agent i to its neighbor j
given as Ti j(t) in (9) as
Ti j(t) = max
(
Ci(t), di j(t)
)
(18)
Ti j can also be normalized to satisfy
∑
j∈Ni Ti j(t) = 1.
If there is no attack and the network is also synchronized,
then,
∥∥∥r j − hi∥∥∥ ∀ j ∈ Ni is zero, and, consequently, Ti j is
one ∀ j ∈ Ni. Moreover, when there is no attack and agent
i receives considerably different values from its neighbors
before synchronization, e.g. as a result of a change in the state
of the leader, since Ci is close to one as there is no attack, Ti j
is almost one ∀ j ∈ Ni. On the other hand, if agent i is affected
by an attack, then Ci is small and the trust of agent i to agent
j depends on
∥∥∥r j − hi∥∥∥ , j ∈ Ni.
It is shown in Theorem 3 that the proposed observer-based
distributed control protocol (8)-(9) guarantees synchronization
of intact agents, if the following assumption is satisfied.
Assumption 4. The network connectivity is at least (2 f + 1),
i.e., at least half of the neighbors of each agent are intact [43].
Define
H = (L + G) (19)
where L is the graph Laplacian matrix and G is the diagonal
pinning matrix.Then, based on Lemma 1, H is a non-singular
M-matrix. The following lemmas are used in the proof of
Theorem 3.
Lemma 2 [44]. Let P > 0 and Assumption 2 be satisfied.
Then, the solution P to the following ARE equation
AT P + PA + I − PBBT P = 0, (20)
is positive definite.
Lemma 3 [45]. Let Assumption 1 be satisfied. Then, there
exists a positive vector φ = [φ1, . . . , φN]T such that (ΦH +
HT Φ) > 0 where Φ = diag{φ1, . . . , φN}, φ = (HT )−11N , and
H is defined in (19).
Theorem 3. Let Assumption 4 be satisfied. Consider the
dynamic observer defined in (8)-(9) with C j(t) given by
(14) and Ti j(t) defined in (18). Let F = −BT P, c >
φmax
/
λmin(ΦH +HT Φ) and ρ ≥ vmax, where P is the solution
to the algebraic Riccati equation (20) and φmax = max
i=1,...,N
(φi).
Then, ri → ζ0 for all intact agents.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
Remark 2. Note that for Type 1 attacks, the proposed control
framework does not impose any constraints on the number
of neighbors or the total number of agents under attacks.
Note also that in contrast to existing mitigation approaches,
we do not discard the neighbor’s information for an agent
based solely on the difference between their values. Therefore,
when the discrepancy between agents is because of a legitimate
change in the leader, the confidence and trust values for each
agent become 1 and, consequently, all agents synchronize to
the leader.
The following subsection shows how to design a resilient
observer-based H∞ distributed controller. Non-homogeneous
game AREs are derived for solving the optimal H∞ synchro-
nization problem.
C. The proposed resilient controller
It was shown in Theorem 3 that ri → ζ0 for all intact
agents regardless of attacks. Similar to [46], one can show
that if ui(t) in (1) is designed to guarantee xi → ri, using the
separation principle, one can guarantee xi → ζ0. Therefore, in
the following, the control input ui is designed to solve Problem
1 with ζ0 replaced with ri.
Define the error between the state of agent i and its observer
as i(t) = xi(t) − ri(t). The dynamic of the error becomes
˙i(t) = Ai(t) + Bui(t) + Dωi(t) − Bυi(t) (21)
Define the augmented system state as
Xi(t) = [i(t)T ri(t)T ]T ∈ R2n (22)
Using (21) and (8) together yields the augmented system as
X˙i = T Xi + B1ui + D1ωi + E1υi (23)
with
T =
[
A 0
0 A
]
, B1 =
[
B
0
]
,D1 =
[
D
0
]
E1 =
[ −B
B
]
, (24)
The performance output (11) in terms of the augmented
state (22) (while ζ0 is replaced with ri) becomes
‖Zi‖2 = XTi QiXi + uTi Riui, Qi =
[
Q1i 0
0 0
]
Using (8) and (22), the control protocol for the augmented
system can be written as the following non-homogeneous
control input
ui = KiXi + gi (25)
Note that gi is used to compensate the non-homogeneous
term υi in the augmented system (23). With the aid of
(10) (while ζ0 is replaced with ri), define the discounted
performance function in terms of the augmented system (23)
as
J(Xi, ui, ωi) =∫ ∞
t
e−αi(τ−t)
[
XTi QiXi + u
T
i Riui − γi2ωiTωi
]
dτ
(26)
The value function for linear systems is quadratic with the
form as
Vi(Xi(t)) = Xi(t)T PiXi(t) + 2XTi Πi + Γi (27)
and the corresponding Hamiltonian function becomes
H (Xi, ui, ωi) , XTi QiXi + u
T
i Riui − γ2i ωTi ωi − αiVi +
dVi
dt
(28)
Remark 3. It is assumed here that the full state of agents
is available for measurement. However, if not available, the
proposed design procedure can be extended for the case of
dynamics controllers in which the states of agents are esti-
mated using a local observer. This is because local observers
6can estimate agents’ state without any exchange of information
with their neighbors. On the other hand, if the entire agent
is compromised and its state observer is manipulated, its
neighbors detect it and discard its information using the
proposed trust-confidence mechanism.
Theorem 4. (Non-homogenous game ARE) The optimal solu-
tion for the discounted performance function (26) is
u∗i = −Ri−1BT1 (PiXi + Πi) (29)
where Pi and Πi are the solution of the following non-
homogeneous game ARE
PiT + T T Pi − αiPi − PiB1Ri−1BT1 Pi +
1
γ2i
PiD1DT1 Pi + Qi = 0
Π˙i =
(
αiI2n + PiB1Ri−1BT1 − T T − 1γ2i PiD1D
T
1
)
Πi − PiE1υi
Γ˙i = αiΓi + Π
T
i B1Ri
−1BT1 Πi − 1γ2i Π
T
i D1D
T
1 Πi − 2υTi ET1 Πi
(30)
Proof. See Appendix C. 
The following theorem shows that the control protocol (29)
along with (30) solve the H∞ synchronization problem.
Theorem 5. Consider the MAS (1)-(2) with the observer (8)-
(9). Let the control input ui be given as (29)-(30). Then,
Problem 1 is solved.
Proof. See Appendix D. 
V. Model-Free Resilient Off-Policy RL for Solving Optimal
Synchronization for Intact Agents
In this section, an RL algorithm is proposed to solve
Problem 1 on-line without requiring any knowledge of the
agents’ dynamics.
The off-policy RL allows separating the behavior policy
from the target policy for both control input and attack. In
order to find the optimal control (29) without the requirement
of the knowledge of the system dynamics, the off-policy RL
algorithm [47] is used in this subsection. Off-policy algorithm
has two separate stages. In the first stage, an admissible
policy is applied to the system and the system information is
recorded over the time interval T . Then, in the second stage,
without requiring any knowledge of the system dynamics, the
information gathered in stage 1 is repeatedly used to find a
sequence of updated policies uki and ω
k
i converging to u
∗
i and
ω∗i . To this end, the augmented system dynamics (23) is first
written as
X˙i = T kXi + B1
(
ui − uki
)
+ D1
(
ωi − ωki
)
+ E1υi (31)
where Xi is defined in (22) and uki and ω
k
i denote the control
and disturbance target policies in iteration k to be updated.
Now, using (27), one has
Vki (Xi(t)) = Xi(t)
T Pki Xi(t) + 2X
T
i Π
k
i + Γ
k
i (32)
In this case, the control policy and worst case attack signal
(56) can be written as
uk+1i = −Ri−1BT1 (Pki Xi + Πki )
ωk+1i =
1
γ2i
DT1 (P
k
i Xi + Π
k
i )
(33)
Taking time derivative of Vki along the augmented system
dynamic (32) yields
V˙ki (Xi(t)) = αi
(
Xi(t)T Pki Xi(t) + 2X
T
i Π
k
i + Γ
k
i
)
− XTi QiXi
−(uki )T Ri(uki ) − 2(uk+1i )T Ri(ui − uki )
+γ2i (ω
k
i )
T (ωki ) + 2γ
2
i (ω
k+1
i )
T (ωi − ωki )
(34)
The following off-policy integral RL Bellman equation is
derived by multiplying both sides of (34) by e−αi(τ−t) and
integrating
e−αiT Vki (Xi(t + T )) − Vki (Xi(t))
= −
∫ t+T
t
e−αi(τ−t)
(
XTi QiXi + (u
k
i )
T
Ri(uki ) − γ2i (ωki )T (ωki )
)
dτ
+
∫ t+T
t
e−αi(τ−t)
(
2γ2i (ω
k+1
i )
T
(ωi − ωki ) − 2(uk+1i )T Ri(ui − uki )
)
dτ
(35)
The off-policy RL algorithm presented by iterating on
(35) to solve the non-homogeneous game ARE, is listed in
Algorithm 1.
The following theorem shows that using the proposed
control framework, the learning mechanism is resilient against
both Types 1 and 2 attacks.
Theorem 6. Consider the MAS (1)-(2) under the control
protocol (29) with the observer dynamics given by (8)-(9). Let
the off-policy Algorithm 1 be used to learn the gains in (29).
Then, Problem 1 is solved, if Assumptions 1 to 4 are satisfied.
Proof. Similar to [47], one can show that the off-policy RL
Algorithm 1 solves Problem 1 in an optimal manner, as long
as ri → ζ0. That is, for intact agents xi → ζ0 and for a
compromised agent the L2 condition (10) is satisfied. This
boils down the proof to show that ri → ζ0 even if the system
is under attack. On the other hand, Theorem 3 shows that
ri → ζ0 regardless of attacks. This completes the proof. 
Remark 4. In the proposed Algorithm 1, steps 4 to 9 for
finding the trust and confidence values are continually em-
ployed even after learning. However, once the optimal gain is
found, the learning steps 10-12 are skipped, because the gains
required for the control policy are computed and there is no
need for further computation, unless another learning phase
is initiated by any change in the agent dynamics. One might
argue that the off-policy Algorithm 1 requires to measure the
attack signal ωi(t) which is restrictive. However, the off-policy
Algorithm can learn about the worst-case attack signal using
actual measurable disturbances (either applied intentionally
or coming from nature), instead of measuring attack signals.
Once it learned the worst-case scenario, it can attenuate attacks
without measuring them.
VI. Simulation Results
In this section, an example is provided to verify the effec-
tiveness of the proposed control protocol. The communication
graph is given in Fig. 3.
Consider 5 agents with dynamics as
x˙i =
[
0 −4
1 0
]
xi +
[
1
0
]
ui +
[
1
0
]
ωi (36)
7Algorithm 1 Autonomous Resilient Control Protocol (ARCP)
for agent i
1: Procedure ARCP
2: Apply an admissible behavior policy to the agent
3: For i=1:N
4: Use r j, j ∈ Ni to compute si and oi
5: Compute Ci as
Ci(t) = β
∫ t
0
∆ie−β(t−τ)
∆i + ‖si(τ) − oi(τ)‖dτ
6: Communicate Ci with agents j ∈ Ni
7: For each agent j ∈ Ni , compute
di j(t) = κ
∫ t
0
θie−κ(t−τ)
θi +
∥∥∥∥∥∥r j(τ) − 1|Ni | ∑j∈Ni r j
∥∥∥∥∥∥
dτ
Ti j(t) = max
(
Ci(t), di j(t)
)
8: Use C j, j ∈ Ni and Ti j to find
ηi =
∑
j∈Ni
C j(t)Ti j(t)ai j(r j − ri) + bi(ζ0 − ri)
9: Compute the observer state ri using update law (8)
10: Collect enough samples Xi = [Xi; Xi(iTs)] and ui at
different sampling interval Ts
11: End for
12: Given uki and collected information solve the following
Bellman equation
e−αiT Vki (Xi(t + T )) − Vki (Xi(t)) =
−
∫ t+T
t
e−αi(τ−t)
(
XTi QiXi + (u
k
i )
T
Ri(uki ) − γ2i (ωki )T (ωki )
)
dτ
+2γ2i
∫ t+T
t
e−αi(τ−t)(ωk+1i )
T
(ωi − ωki )dτ
−2
∫ t+T
t
e−αi(τ−t)(uk+1i )
T
Ri(ui − uki )dτ
13: Once the learning is done, replace the behavior policy
with the control solution found using RL
Fig. 3: The communication graph among the agents.
The leader dynamics is given by
x˙0 =
[
0 −4
1 0
]
x0 +
[
1
0
] (
4e−0.15t sin(2t)
)
(37)
The design parameters are Q1i = 100I2, Ri = 1, αi = 0.1
and, γi = 10 for all agents. Now, assume that Agent 2 is
0 5 10 15 20
Time(s)
-10
-5
0
5
10
Leader
Agent 1
Disrupted Agent 2
Agent 3
Agent 4
Agent 5
(a)
0 5 10 15 20
Time(s)
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
e1
e2
e3
e4
e5
(b)
Fig. 4: Agents state, when Agent 2 is under the Type 1 attack (38). (a) The standard
control protocol (5) is used. (b) The local neighborhood tracking error (4) for each agent.
affected by a Type 1 attack with the attack signal ω2 given as
ω2 =
{
10 sin(2t) t ≥ 10
0 otherwise
(38)
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Fig. 5: The state of all agents when Agent 2 is under Type 1 attack and the observer
defined in (8) is used for each agent.
The agents’ states are shown in Fig. 4. It is observed from
Fig. 4a that when the standard distributed controller (5) is used,
before attack all agents synchronize to the leader. However,
after the attack, Agents 4 and 5, which have a path to the
compromised Agent 2, do not synchronize to the leader. One
can see from Fig. 4b that, as stated in Theorem 2, the local
neighborhood tracking error (4) converges to zero for all intact
agents except the compromised agent.
The performance of the observer-based H∞ controller (29)
in the presence of Type 1 attack (38) is shown in Fig. 5. One
can see that the compromised agent is the only agent that does
not follow the leader. Moreover, the H∞ controller attenuates
the effect of the attack on the disrupted agent, which can be
seen by comparing the deviation level of the compromised
agent state from its desired value in Figs. 4a and 5.
Now, assume that Agent 2 is under Type 2 attack. In this
case, the attack signal (38) is applied to the observer of
Agent 2. However, Assumption 4 is not satisfied. The result
is shown in Fig. 6. It can be seen from Fig. 6a that using
the trust-confidence mechanism, only the compromised agent
and its direct neighbor do not synchronize to the leader. The
confidence value of the agents is shown in Fig. 6b. One
can see that Agents 4 and 5 are not confident about their
own observer information, since they are in the path of the
compromised agent. To satisfy Assumption 4, it is considered
that 2 incoming links from Agent 5 and Agent 1 are connected
to Agent 4. Fig. 7 shows the agents output and confidence
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Fig. 6: Agent 2 is under Type 2 attack but Assumption 4 does not hold. (a) Agents state
when the control protocol (29) with the observer (9) is used. (b) Confidence values of
all agents.
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Fig. 7: Agent 2 is under Type 2 attack and Assumption 4 holds. (a) Agents state when the
control protocol (29) with the observer (9) is used. (b) Confidence values of all agents.
value when Assumption 4 is satisfied. It can be seen from
Fig. 7a that only the compromised agent does not synchronize
to the leader and all intact agents converge to the leader.
The confidence value of the agents is shown in Fig. 7b. One
can see that Agent 4 is not confident about its own observer
information since it is the only immediate neighbor of the
compromised agent.
VII. Conclusion
A resilient autonomous control framework is proposed for
a leader-follower MAS with an active leader. It is first shown
that existing standard synchronization control protocols are
prone to attacks. Then, a resilient learning-based control proto-
col is presented to find optimal solutions to the synchronization
problem in the presence of attacks and system dynamic
uncertainties. A distributed observer-based H∞ controller is
first designed to prevent propagating the effects of attacks
on sensors and actuators throughout the network, as well as
attenuating the effect of these attacks on the compromised
agent itself. Non-homogeneous game algebraic Riccati equa-
tions are derived to solve the H∞ optimal synchronization
problem. Off-policy reinforcement learning is utilized to learn
their solution without requiring any knowledge of the agent’s
dynamics. Then, a trust-confidence based distributed control
protocol is proposed to mitigate attacks that hijack the entire
node and attacks on communication links. It is shown that the
proposed RL-based H∞ control protocol is resilient against
attacks.
Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 2
Let L¯ be the graph Laplacian matrix of the entire network,
in which the leader is the only root node and N followers are
non-root nodes. Then, it can be partitioned as
L¯ =
0 0 . . . 0−∆ L f
 ∈ R(N+1)×(N+1) (39)
where ∆ ∈ RN×1 denotes a vector whose i-th element is
nonzero and indicates that the follower i is connected to the
leader. L f ∈ RN×N indicates the interaction between the leader
and the followers. Without loss of generality, assume D = B.
Using (6), the global dynamic of the MAS (1) under attack
with the control input (5) in terms of the Laplacian matrix
(39) and after some manipulations, one has
x˙ =
(IN+1 ⊗ A) x +
 B0
 v0 + (IN+1 ⊗ B)(
−(c1 + c2
/∥∥∥∥((L¯ ⊗ K) x∥∥∥∥)L¯ ⊗ K + ω¯), i f
∥∥∥∥((L¯ ⊗ K) x∥∥∥∥ , 0
(IN+1 ⊗ A) x +
 B0
 v0
+ (IN+1 ⊗ B)
(
−c1L¯ ⊗ K + ω¯
), i f ∥∥∥∥((L¯ ⊗ K) x∥∥∥∥ = 0
(40)
where x = [ζT0 , x
T
1 , . . . , x
T
N]
T and ω¯ = [0, ωT1 , . . . , ω
T
N]
T , and
0 in ω¯ indicates that the leader is a trusted node and is not
under attack. It can be seen that agents reach a steady state, i.e.,
x˙i → Axi + [BT 0]T v0, if the last terms of (40) tend to zero, i.e.,
ω¯ ∈ Im(c¯(L¯ ⊗ K)), where c¯ = (c1 + c2/‖(L¯ ⊗ K)x‖) or c¯ = c1.
Otherwise, since the attack signal has common eigenvalues
with the agent dynamics, the agents’ states go to infinity. In
the latter case, the local neighborhood tracking error goes to
zero as xi → ∞. To prove the former case, we first show that
ω¯ ∈ Im(c¯(L¯ ⊗ K)), if the attack signal is designed as given
in the statement of Theorem. Note that ω¯ ∈ Im(c¯(L¯ ⊗ K)), if
there exists a nonzero vector xs such that
c¯(L¯ ⊗ K)xss = ω¯ (41)
Define xss = [ζTs , x
T
s ]
T , where ζs and xs denote the steady
states of the leader and followers, respectively. Since the leader
is not under attack, using (39) and (41), one has ζ˙s = Aζ0 +Bv0
and for the followers,
− c¯(∆ ⊗ K)ζs + c¯(L f ⊗ K)xs = ω (42)
Based on Assumption 1, the followers have at least one
incoming link from the leader. On the other hand, L f captures
the interaction among all followers, as well as the incoming
link from the leader. The former is a positive semi-definite
Laplacian matrix and the latter is a diagonal matrix with at
least one nonzero positive element added to it. Therefore, as
stated in Lemma 1, L f is nonsingular and, thus, the solution
to (42) becomes
xs = (c¯(L f ⊗ K))−1(ω + c¯(∆ ⊗ K)ζs) (43)
Since the eigenvalues of the attack signal are assumed a
subset of the eigenvalues of the agent dynamics A, for every
ω¯ there exists a nonzero vector xss such that (41) holds.
Therefore, ω¯ ∈ Im(c¯(L¯⊗K)). Now, using (39), the global form
of the state neighborhood tracking error (4) can be written as
e = −(L¯ ⊗ In)x (44)
9Since (41) is satisfied, one has
c¯(L¯ ⊗ K)xs = ω¯⇒ c¯(IN ⊗ K)e = −ω¯ (45)
or, equivalently
c¯Kei = −ωi (46)
Equation (46) implies that the local neighborhood tracking
error is zero, i.e., e j = 0 for intact agents that are not directly
under attacks, i.e., ω j = 0∀ j , i. This completes the proof.
Appendix B
Proof of Theorem 3
Type 1 attacks cannot affect the observer state since the
observer cannot be physically affected by an attacker. On the
other hand for Type 2 attacks, based on Assumption 4, the
total number of compromised agents is assumed less than half
of the network connectivity, i.e., 2 f + 1. Therefore, even if
f neighbors of an intact agent are attacked and collude to
send the same value to misguide it, there still exists f + 1
intact neighbors that communicate values different than the
compromised ones. Thus, r j , ri for some j ∈ Ni and,
therefore, although oi in (12) is zero based on Theorem 2, si in
(13) is nonzero and, consequently, its confidence value Ci in
(14) will decrease and the attack will be detected. Moreover,
since at least half of its neighbors are intact, it can update
its trust values to remove the compromised neighbors. On the
other hand, the entire network is still connected to the agent
under attack and, therefore, the graph is still connected with
the intact agents. Therefore, there exists a spanning tree in
the graph associated with all intact agents. Let LI(t) be the
graph of remaining intact agents with a¯i j = C j(t)Ti j(t)ai j as its
weights. Since LI(t) has a spanning tree, based on the above
discussion, the inequality defined in Lemma 2 is still satisfied.
The global form of the observer (8) can be written as
r˙ = (IN ⊗ A)r + (c(LI(t) + G) ⊗ BF)η + (ρIN ⊗ B)Ψ (47)
where r = [rT1 , . . . , r
T
N]
T denotes the global state vector of the
agents observer and Ψ = [h(Fη1), . . . , h(FηN)]T . The global
form of (9) is
η = ((LI(t) + G) ⊗ In)(r − ζ0) (48)
where η = [ηT1 , . . . , η
T
N]
T and ζ
0
= (1N ⊗ In)ζ0. Using (47) and
defining HI(t) = LI(t) + G, the dynamic of the tracking error
(48) becomes
η˙ = (IN ⊗ A)η + (cHI(t) ⊗ BF)η + (HI(t) ⊗ B)(ρΨ − v0) (49)
with v0 = 1N ⊗ v0. Consider the Lyapunov candidate function
as
V(η) = ηT (Φ ⊗ P)η (50)
where Φ is defined in Lemma 3 and is a positive definite
matrix. Using (49), the time derivative of (50) yields
V˙ = 2ηT (Φ ⊗ PA)η + 2ηT (cΦHI(t) ⊗ PBF)η︸                                               ︷︷                                               ︸
V1
+ 2ηT (ΦHI(t) ⊗ PB)(ρΨ − v0)︸                               ︷︷                               ︸
V2
(51)
Substituting F = −BT P, V1 can be expressed as
V1 = ηT (Φ⊗(PA+AT P))η−cηT ((ΦHI(t)+HTI (t)Φ)⊗PBBT P)η
(52)
Based on Lemma 3, (ΦHI(t) + HTI (t)Φ) > 0 and the
inequality −c(ΦHI(t)+HTI (t)Φ) ≤ −cλmin(ΦHI(t)+HTI (t)Φ) ≤
−cλmin(ΦHI(t) +HTI (t)Φ)Φ
/
φmax holds [48]. Using the Kro-
necker property A ⊗ (B + C) = A ⊗ B + A ⊗ C and ARE (20),
(52) becomes
V1 =
ηT (Φ ⊗ (PA + AT P))η − cηT ((ΦHI(t) +HTI (t)Φ) ⊗ PBBT P)η
≤ −ηT (Φ ⊗ In)η
+
(
1 − cλmin(ΦHI(t) +H
T
I (t)Φ)
φmax
)
ηT (Φ ⊗ PBBT P)η
(53)
Therefore, V1 ≤ 0 if c ≥ φmax/λmin(ΦHI(t) +HTI (t)Φ),
which is satisfied if the condition of c in the statement of
the theorem is held. Now, for V2 one has
V2 =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
αi jη
T
j PB(ρψi−v0) ≤ −(ρ−vM)
N∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥BT P
N∑
j=1
αi jη
T
j
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
(54)
This implies that V2 ≤ 0, if ρ ≥ vM . Therefore, V˙ =
V1 + V2 ≤ 0, if the conditions defined in the statement of
the theorem are satisfied. Since V˙(t) ≤ 0, V(t) is bounded.
Note that V˙(t) ≡ 0 implies that η = 0. Hence, using LaSalles
invariance principle [49], it follows that the observer state ri
asymptotically converges to the leader state ζ0.
Appendix C
Proof of Theorem 4
Using the value function (27) for the left-hand side of (26)
and differentiating along with the augmented system (23) gives
the following Bellman equation
H (Xi, ui, ωi) = 2XTi Pi(T Xi + B1ui + D1ωi + E1υi)
+2(T Xi + B1ui + D1ωi + E1υi)T Πi + 2XTi Π˙i + Γ˙i
−αi
(
Xi(t)T PiXi(t) + 2XTi Πi + Γi
)
+XTi QiXi + u
T
i Riui − γ2i ωTi ωi = 0
(55)
By applying the stationary conditions [50] as ∂Hi
/
∂ui = 0,
∂Hi
/
∂ωi = 0, the optimal control and the worst case attack
signal can be written as
u∗i = −Ri−1BT1 (PiXi + Πi)
ω∗i =
1
γ2i
DT1 (PiXi + Πi)
(56)
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Substituting (56) into Bellman equation (55) results in the
following tracking game ARE
H
(
Xi, u∗i , ω
∗
i
)
= XTi
(
PiT + T T Pi − αiPi − PiB1Ri−1BT1 P i
+
1
γ2i
PiD1DT1 Pi + Qi
 Xi + 2XTi (Π˙i − PiB1Ri−1BT1 Πi+
+
1
γ2i
PiD1DT1 Πi + PiE1υi − αiΠi + T T Πi

+
Γ˙i − αiΓi − ΠTi B1R−1i BT1 Πi + 1γ2i ΠTi D1DT1 Πi + 2υTi ET1 Πi
 = 0
(57)
Since (57) is satisfied for all Xi, this can occur if, and only
if, (30) holds. This completes the proof.
Appendix D
Proof of Theorem 5
The Hamiltonian function (28) for the optimal value func-
tion V∗i , and any control policy ui and disturbance policy ωi
become
H(V∗i , ui, di) = X
T
i QiXi + u
T
i Riui − γ2i ωTi ωi − αiV∗i
+V∗TiX (T Xi + B1ui + D1ωi + E1υi)
(58)
Using (57), one has H(V∗i , ui, di) = H(V
∗
i , u
∗
i , ω
∗
i ) +
(ui − u∗i )T Ri(ui − u∗i ) + γ2(ωi − ω∗i )T (ωi − ω∗i ) and based
on Hamiltonian equation (28), H(V∗i , u
∗
i , ω
∗
i ) = 0.
Then (58) gives XTi QiXi + u
T
i Riui − γ2i ωTi ωi − αiV∗i +
V∗TiX (T Xi + B1ui + D1ωi + E1υi) = −(ui − u∗i )T Ri(ui − u∗i ) −
γ2(ωi − ω∗i )T (ωi − ω∗i ). Now, using the optimal control policy
ui = u∗i yields
XTi QiXi + u
T
i Riui − γ2i ωTi ωi − αiV∗i
+V∗TiX (T Xi + B1ui + D1ωi + E1υi)
= −γ2(ωi − ω∗i )T (ωi − ω∗i ) ≤ 0
(59)
Multiplying both sides of (59) by e−αit, and defining V˙∗i =
V∗TiX (T Xi + B1ui + D1ωi + E1υi) as the derivative of V
∗
i along
the trajectories of the closed-loop system, gives
d/dt
(
e−αitV∗i
)
≤ e−αit
(
−XTi QiXi − uTi Riui + γ2i ωTi ωi
)
(60)
Integrating both sides of (60) and using the fact that V∗i (.) ≥
0, for every T > 0 and every ωi ∈ L2[0,∞), one has∫ T
0
e−αiτ
(
XTi QiXi + u
∗T
i Riu
∗
i
)
dτ
≤
∫ T
0
e−αiτγ2i ω
T
i ωidτ + V
∗
i (X(0))
(61)
Using the separation principle for the combination of the
observer and the controller completes the proof of Part 1 of
Problem 1. The proof of Part 2 is similar to [47] and, therefore,
is omitted.
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